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Japan’s lead in many modern technologies is now well recognized. It is also accepted 
that Japan’s emergence as a techno-economic superpower has been the outcome of 
concerted policy effort. This paper, taking a non conventional stance, attempts to 
explain the process of policy evolution and implementation by looking at the role of 
prevailing informal institutions such as customs and cultural norms of Japanese 
society. In this regard this study explores the extent to which cultural norms and 
values may have influenced policy making exercises. Moreover, unlike other studies, 
this takes a more flexible definition of culture, admitting that cultural norms have 
cognitive underpinnings, and are, therefore, more amenable to change. Finally, an 
attempt has been made to identify the relevant lessons, if any, for India. 
 
The paper is a part of the series being brought out under ICRIER’s Japan Project, 
which is funded by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), Tokyo. It was presented at 
a Conference on “Politics and Civil Society in India and Japan” organized by 
ICRIER on February 20, 2008 at New Delhi at which useful comments were received. 
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Abstract 
 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse some aspects of Japanese  policy in the 
post World War-II period and understand how the various informal institutions 
(shared mental models) have influenced key dimensions of technology strategy with 
regard to the nature and trajectory of activities it sought to promote. Previous studies 
have mainly focused on industrial policy on the basis of the White Papers published 
by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). Our study, in contrast, 
focuses exclusively on technology policies by examining the White Papers on Science 
and Technology (Kagakugijutsu Hakusho) published by the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). We then endeavour to understand 
the significance of our findings for policy making in India. However, the limited 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Recent theories in development economics admit the importance of institutions in 
shaping the development trajectories of a country (Adelman 2002). Such an 
understanding has, however, resulted in an attempt to transfer the institutional 
framework of successfully developed economies to other countries in the belief that 
such relocation would promote economic development in the latter (Ensminger 1996). 
Although the importance of institutional learning across countries remains an 
important source of institutional change, a growing amount of literature in modern 
institutional economics often points out that such transfers may fail to achieve 
desirable outcomes. This vision contradicts the views expressed in orthodox economic 
theory, where transfers of institution or policy from one country to another have been 
justified purely on the basis of its performances in the “donor” countries. Recent 
trends in the institutional and evolutionary theories of institutional change, on the 
other hand, argue that formal institutions, law and policies are often grounded in 
various informal norms and belief structures of a society (which, in turn, forms an 
accumulated body of knowledge), and may become quite ineffective if transferred to 
societies/countries having a different set of customs and belief structures (North 1990, 
1993). Recent progress in development theory also acknowledges that policies 
                                                 
# Centre for Studies in Science Policy, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New 
Delhi. Email: saradindu@mail.jnu.ac.in 
* Centre for Japanese, Korean and North-East Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature and 
Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Email: janashruti@hotmail.com   2
imposed from outside often lead to undesirable consequences, if they do not allow 
people to grow “using their own intelligence” (Stiglitz 2002).  
 
Japan’s technological superiority in many modern technologies is now well 
recognised (Shishido 1983). It is also accepted  that Japan’s emergence as a techno-
economic superpower has been the outcome of concerted policy effort (Lall 1981, 
Freeman 1987), which continues to be a prime driver of Japanese technological 
development in the era of globalisation (Fransman 1995). Our paper intends to 
explore how some of these policy elements have been guided or shaped by prevailing 
informal institutions (customs and cultural norms) of Japanese society. It may be 
noted that exploring the role of cultural factors behind Japan’s industrial success has 
been a popular research agenda (see Johnson 1999 for a review). However, our study 
deviates from such studies in two important respects. First, instead of relating culture 
to economic performance, we explore to what extent cultural norms and values may 
have influenced the policy making exercises.
1 Secondly, unlike many other studies, 
we take a more flexible definition of culture, admitting that cultural norms have 
cognitive underpinnings, and are, therefore, more amenable to change. Indeed, 
defining culture as a “latent variable” having a “tight network of a few abstract central 
themes” (DiMaggio 1997: 4) makes it a watertight compartment of beliefs and 
customs, and, therefore, less amenable to change. For the purpose of our analysis we 
draw upon a more recent conceptualisation of cultural norms as cognitively-mediated, 
socially-shaped “shared mental models” of individual members in a society (Johnson-
Laird 1983, Denzau and North 1994). In our view, such a conceptualisation makes 
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cultural norms more flexible and captures the possibilities of cultural change through 
cross cultural learning and other political economic feedback.  
 
We have organised the paper in the following way. In the next section (section 2) we 
develop our conceptual framework of institutions and shared mental models. Section 
3 analyses the factors, which, in our view, have crucially shaped the so-called shared 
mental models of policy making in Japan. The methodological approach is discussed 
in section 4. Section 5 analyses the links between informal values and formal policies. 
Finally, section 6 draws the significance for India and concludes. 
 
2.  Institutions and shared mental models: a conceptual framework 
 
Offering a comprehensive definition of institution has always been a challenging task. 
In its broadest sense, institutions are defined as “regular, patterned behaviour of 
people in a society”, and the… “ideas and values associated with these regularities” 
Neale (1994: 402) and  North (1990) make a distinction between formal and informal 
institutions. Formal institutions refer to rules, laws, and the constitutional framework 
of a country. Informal institutions, on the other hand, refer to the existing norms of 
behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct in a society (North 1990, 
1993). Nevertheless, both sets of institutions can be conceptualised as humanly 
devised constraints (enabling or otherwise) that shape human interaction (North 1990, 
Noteboom 1999).  In a nutshell, therefore, institutions can be defined as a set of 
normative social rules that outline human interface (Mantzavinos 2001).  
   4
In principle, although, formal institutions can be (are) created and altered by official 
fiats, their dynamics are often shaped /constrained by informal institutions. Unlike the 
former kind, informal institutions often emerge and change ‘spontaneously’ through 
inter-personal interactions and collective learning (Mantzavinos et al 2004). 
Understandably, this group can be changed at a speed which is much slower than the 
pace with which formal institutions are modified. It is this relative inflexibility of 
informal institutions, which, according to many, may render any transfer of formal 
institutions (through official fiat) ineffective in the long run. Thus, one may safely 
argue that inter-cultural differences in informal institutions explain much of the 
diversities in formal institutions, and  constrain the possibility of automatic, smooth 
transfer of institutions, as is often envisaged in neoclassical economics (North 1993). 
To summarise, institutional change is a path dependent process, and its root often lies 
in the culturally-shaped, ‘spontaneously-evolved’, informal institutions of a society.  
 
Recent development in cognitive science and social psychology has provided some 
mechanism to understand the way informal institutions are formed and evolve. These 
studies insist that a change in cultural parameters (conventions and norms) seem to 
take place through cognitive systems of individuals, which “constructs models of the 
problem space that are then mentally run or manipulated to produce expectations 
about the environment” (Holland et al 1986: 12). The concept of mental models is 
important in this context. Mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983) are the symbolic 
(subjective) representation of the environment, and are constructed through diverse 
experience, observations and cognitively mediated learning. Such mental models 
develop into a shared mental model through communication between people, and help 
perceive the solutions to recurrent problems of social interaction in a similar way.   5
However, evolution of shared mental models through such direct interaction 
(learning) is a slow process. Socially mediated indirect learning assumes high 
importance in this context. The speed of the formation of shared mental models can 
be increased through such indirect learning. Thus, common interpretation of a social 
reality would be achieved faster, helping in turn, to prescribe how the environment 
ought to be structured (Denzau and North 1994, Mantzavinos 2001: chapter 6, 
Zweynert 2006). Factors like language, social values, and intellectual tradition are 
important in this regard.
2  In the next section we elaborate on these factors in the 
context of Japan. 
 
3.  Intellectual tradition and social values in Japan 
 
3.1  Intellectual tradition  
 
A pioneering attempt to understand the way intellectual tradition shapes the shared 
mental models with reference to the direction of institutional change is made by 
Zweynert (2006).
3 The paper argues how the post Second World War system of social 
capitalism in West Germany was based on a long intellectual tradition of socialism 
and romantic movements of previous centuries. In fact, a striking similarity between 
Russia and Germany has been the prevalence of a deep-rooted intellectual tradition 
upholding the various ideals of socialism and romanticism. Consequently, the 
apparent failure of Russia to embark on the path of free market economies in recent 
years has also been attributed to the absence of an intellectual tradition supporting 
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liberal, laissez-faire philosophies. For our analyses, we confine our discussion only to 
the intellectual tradition in the domain of economics.  
 
Unlike in the West, where laissez faire and neoclassical thought emerged as the 
dominant school of contemplation in economics from the twentieth century, Japan has 
had a strong tradition of drawing its economic agenda from a heterogeneous body, 
predominantly non-laissez faire, of economic reflection. As a result, for a long time, 
economics in Japan was believed to have national grammars (Johnson 1999: 22). To 
understand the rationale behind technology policymaking in Japan, one should, 
therefore, comprehend the dynamics of economic thought prevalent there. 
 
The term for economics in Japan is Keizai, which means “administering the nation 
and relieving the suffering of the people” (Morris-Suzuki 1989: 13-14). Intrinsically, 
therefore, the shared mental model of Japanese society acknowledged an active role 
of the State in economic decision-making, and economics as a subject perceived as 
being engaged with the welfare of people. Even in the Tokugawa (pre-Meiji) period, 
the word, “ching-chi-hsueh”, used for economics is synonymous with the term 
“political economy” (Ejiro 1946, as in Burks 1950: 395), with emphasis on 
administration, government and livelihood (ibid). Economics in Japan has, thus, 
always revolved around the concept of institution, as opposed to the concept of “homo 
economicus”, propagated by the Liberal economists. Another characteristic feature of 
their traditional economic thought, in the Tokugawa period, has been a non-separation 
of economic theory from applied economics, once again a, system of thought not 
much prevalent in liberal economic thinking (ibid). We argue that the shared mental 
models developed through such a conceptualisation of economics in the Tokugawa   7
period, shaped the way Japan embraced more modern western economic thought after 
the Meiji Restoration, reflecting a path dependency in their attitude to economic 
problems (see also Burks 1950). Indeed, it is perhaps not a surprise that among many 
competing western economic thoughts, the German Historical School found easy 
acceptance among economists in particular, and academia in general, in Japan 
(Morris-Suzuki 1989, Nishizawa 2001).
4 
 
The German Historical School represented a conglomeration of ideas bordering on 
laissez-faire on one extreme and Marxism on the other. A key difference between the 
proponents of this school and the free-trade discipline lies with respect to the role of 
government. The Historical school is opposed to reducing the role of the State to a 
mere regulator. The Historical School also criticised British classical economics for 
its over-emphasis on deductive theorisation. According to Gustav von Schmoller, a 
prime architect of the Historical school, collection and analysis of factual economic 
data should be the main occupation of economists, rather than deductive theorisation 
(Morris-Suzuki 1989: 62-63). At the other extreme it was opposed to Marxian 
thought, on the issues of rapid transformation of society through revolution, and on 
the principles of property rights. Unlike the Marxist school, it supported the system of 
private property rights for economic development and did not see much merit in 
revolutionary change of a society. A detailed analysis of the German Historical 
School is, however, beyond the scope of this study. We, instead, present a summary 
of the salient features of this, rather heterogeneous, body of economic theories as 
                                                 
4 Please note that Keynesian, Classical, as well as the Marxist school had also had important influence 
in the evolution of economic thought in Japan (Morris-Suzuki 1989). However, for the particular 
aspects of technology policy we are interested to explore, the contribution of the German Historical 
School seems to be more important. This is not, however, to deny that the presence of diverse 
schools of thought had enabled them to take an innovative approach to the various policy issues.    8




The proponents of the German Historical School unanimously proclaimed that the 
economic system, the conception of economic theory and jurisprudence, are 
interrelated and results of some definite historical development. According to the 
German Historical School, therefore, the emergence and growth of laissez faire 
economics in Europe and USA was an outcome of some specific historical 
developments in those countries, which gave credence to the principle of 
individualism. One may note that the principles of laissez-faire economics draw 
heavily upon methodological individualism. In contrast, the individual’s role, 
according to the Historical School, is to be located within the community.
6 Contrary 
to the Walrasian theory of general equilibrium, where socio-economic norms of an 
economy remain unchanged (Schumpeter 2005), the Historical School viewed the 
economic system as intrinsically dynamic in nature. A third important building block 
of the Historical school was, perhaps, the attempt to explicitly relate economics with 
ethics. They propounded that economics is “not a morally neutral positivist science, 
but a means to the achievement of a healthy and harmonious society” (Morris-Suzuki 
1989: 63) through inclusion of moral and ethical dimensions of a society in the 
domain of economic analyses. Finally, the Historical School favoured more active 
state intervention in economic decision-making than that of a mere regulator, as 
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viewed by the laissez-faire economists, whose primary job is to protect its citizens 
from violence and fraud. The Historical School propagated that the State should 
explicitly engage itself in various activities ranging from promoting intellectual and 
aesthetic culture, to protecting the weaker sections of society to, in particular, 
securing labour rights.  
 
The introduction of the ideas of the German Historical School to Japan, perhaps, dates 
back to 1888 in the writings of Kanai Noburu, and, later on, through the interventions 
of economists like Tokuzo Fukuda (Morris-Suzuki 1989: 65, Nishizawa 2001: 155). 
The reception and the subsequent diffusion of the principles of the Historical School 
in Japan was more than mere coincidence and can be related to some situational 
similarities between Germany and Japan.  
 
Among the situational factors, Germany and Japan were following a path of rapid 
industrialisation under a strong State at the turn of the 19
th century, which led to social 
dislocation. There was, therefore, some logic in arguing for governmental policies to 
mitigate the adverse effect of dislocation and prevent the possibilities of social unrest. 
However, we go beyond such situational comparison and argue that the main reason 
for accepting the ideas of the Historical School lay at the prevalent shared mental 
models towards economics and policymaking in Japan. 
 
Although the intellectual development along the lines of the Historical School could 
not continue smoothly after World War II, it left a lasting impact on the trajectory of 
economic thought in Japan (Johnson 1999, Nishizawa 2001). Except for a brief 
period, Japanese academicians, were, as a result, never comfortable with a laissez-  10
faire economic system and the historical framework of neoclassical economics (see 
Morris-Suzuki 1989: 91-94, 180-188). This influence was particularly discernible in 
the attempts of some leading Japanese economists to accord priorities to welfare 
issues over simple price-based market dynamics.  
 
3.2  Social values  
 
Values ingrained in society too play a pivotal role in shaping a shared mental model 
by providing a common understanding of what ‘ought to be done’. Two things, 
however, need to be clarified at this juncture. First, whether the whole of Japan can be 
treated as a single cultural entity, and second, how one conceptualises the term 
‘culture’. On the first point, it may indeed be difficult, at times, to equate Japanese 
social values with the homogeneity of Japanese culture. However, the broad, 
overarching social values we would like to examine in formal documents can safely 
be assumed to fall outside such a domain of disputes. On the second point, we have 
already mentioned that we would like to conceptualise culture rather loosely, where 
“individuals experience culture as disparate bits of information and as schematic 
structures that organize that information” (DiMaggio 1997: 1)  
 
Such a conceptualisation has two distinct advantages. First, it emphasises that culture 
is essentially a cognitive process, and, as a consequence, the mechanism of cultural 
change can be assumed to lie within the cognitive processes of individuals. As a 
result, secondly, the social values derived from culture can be equated with the 
concept of shared mental models, which too is developed through a cognitive process. 
In other words, cultural change involves a learning process, which helps develop a   11
scheme for a problem situation. Often such a scheme may develop while dealing with 
situational problems, like late development, lack of resources as highlighted by 
Benedict. Indeed, Benedict argues that culture, besides being inherent in a social 
system, can also be learned from day to day living (1946: 11). Conventionally, 
nevertheless, situational motivations have been sought to distinguish from “basic 
values” (Johnson 1999: 8). Defining culture as schematic representation of problem 
situations, on the other hand, takes away much of the merit of such distinction. It can, 
consequently, be argued that any situational motive may become a ‘social norm’ or 
‘code of conduct’ in a society, once it has been successful, perhaps repeatedly, in 
solving a particular situational problem. 
 
The dominant values we would be examining have been a part of Japanese society for 
quite some time to be of importance in shaping a Japanese rationale. Below we 
discuss some of these values, which are important for our research.  
 
3.2.1  Adhering to hierarchy 
 
Japanese society, according to many sociologist and cultural anthropologists, has a 
‘vertical’ orientation with many tiers of hierarchy where the interpersonal bonds 
between the superior and the junior are strong and carry much significance (Nakane 
1970). The reflections of this can be seen in language and everyday situations like the 
junior asking for advice or confiding in a senior than to a person who is in the same 
bracket as himself in the hierarchy.
7 The Japanese do not, however, view this rigid 
hierarchical structure as a negative constraint : this dependence on the part of the 
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junior is believed to instil a sense of duty and responsibility in the senior. The junior 
also gains from the experience and feels taken care of. This socially accepted 
interpersonal dimension not only helps find a solution amicably but the knowledge 
arrived at from past experience of the senior gets passed on. For both the junior and 
the senior there are duties assigned by such social conditioning, which have to be 
carried out in earnest. 
 
The hierarchical nature that defines present-day Japan probably has its roots in the 
social division of labour in the uji (clan), the earliest form of agrarian society seen in 
the country. In course of time, clans unified to form bigger provinces with a similar 
social network at play. A bigger administrative unit required more complex feudal 
ties. In Japanese cultural tradition, once a master-follower relationship is established, 
it is presumed to remain harmonious and not be openly challenged at any cost. The 
hierarchical ordering of society was legitimised by the Ie seido in the 16
th century 
under the Tokugawa regime. The word Ie stood for a concept that transcended the 
idea of ‘family’ as ‘a group of individuals living together’. Besides the constituent 
members of the unit called ‘family’ at a particular time, it referred to the position of 
the ‘family’ with respect to the others in the village or the town at any frame of time, 
in the past or the present (Fukutake 1982).  
 
The Ie consciousness required individuals to subordinate their own interests to those 
of the collective interest of the entire household. The will of the household head was 
likely to prevail in deciding any important matter. The head was expected to be 
thoroughly involved with matters concerning the family’s interests, mobilize them 
and take responsibility. The same dynamics were preserved not only at the household   13
level but at any social collective grouping. For example, the local daimyou (feudal 
lord) was responsible for the vassals under him while the Shogun at the administrative 
head was in charge of the local daimyous. 
 
Interestingly, the process of modern state building also involved the same ‘familist’ 
ideals being expanded to the level of the State. The Kazoku- kokka (family state) was 
conceived by the Meiji government leaders and backed by Confucian moral 
principles. Confucian thought was introduced to Japan from China as early as the 12
th 
century. In essence, Confucianism gave the guidelines of proper forms of conduct, 
especially in family and social relationships. Based on filial piety and humanity at its 
core, government based on Confucian values was bound to be a moral government. 
Though bureaucratic in nature, this form of governance was benevolent towards the 
people. Confucianism was revived time and again in Japan to gain control over the 
groups that did not accept the ruling authority.  
 
Many other belief systems such as Buddhism and Taoism were incorporated into the 
Japanese milieu from China but of them all the Confucian spirit remained strong and 
meaningful to the Japanese.  Of the five Confucian values, loyalty to the head was 
given more importance in Japan than China. In the traditional ethos of supremacy to 
the household the Japanese understanding of Confucianism fitted in well.
8 Though, it 
can be argued that revoking Confucianism was adopted as a political strategy of the 
times, it cannot be denied that Confucian values reinforced the societal order. 
 
                                                 
8 Also, ideals of Confucianism proved to be a deterrent to the absolute supremacy of the abstract God 
of Christianity, when the religion tried to establish itself in Japan.   14
Through the Imperial Rescript on Education (1880), primary school education had to 
give importance to the ethics course wherein submission to authority was reinforced. 
In this manner the education imparted in pre-war times may have strengthened the 
value of adhering to hierarchy (Sigurdson and Anderson 1991: 93).   
 
After defeat in the Second World War, which was  fought  in  the  name  of  the      
Emperor, the feudalistic family system on which the ‘national entity’ rested was 
legally abolished. However, legal change did not immediately mean an alteration in 
reality and as a social value the Ie system lives on today. The Emperor was reduced to 
a symbol of the unity of the Japanese people by the New Constitution, but the 
function of an authority above the “subjects” was transferred from the Emperor to the 
State. This Japanese tendency to allow supreme authority to become purely symbolic 
demonstrates their preference of group over individual leadership and may also be an 
indication of the prevalent values of modernization and their understanding of 
democracy.  The attachment to the value of submitting to hierarchy could not be 
mitigated easily.
9 The State had a definite duty and responsibility towards the people 
who voluntarily abided by the decisions. The conventional worth of adherence to 
hierarchy can be explained as a factor on why Japan favoured the German Historical 
School. The German Historical School, as we have discussed in Section 3.1, not only 
opposed reducing the role of the State to a mere regulator but propounded the 
supremacy of the State in most economic decision-making.  
                                                 
9 Today, enterprises are portrayed as families, the State as ‘family of families’, thus investing the 
notion of ‘Japan Inc’ with legitimacy in the country (Lebra 1976).   15
3.2.2  Working as a group 
 
One of the most conspicuous differences between the West and Japan is the desire of 
the Japanese to be identified with a group. “With group-consciousness so highly 
developed there is almost no social life outside the particular group on which an 
individual’s major economic life depends. The individual’s every problem must be 
solved within this frame” (Nakane 1970: 10) Japanese culture has long viewed the 
intricate web of interdependencies as a fundamental fact of human relations. 
According to the moral code of traditional Japan, all problems ---personal and 
otherwise ----are expected to be solved within one's group. 
 
This tendency towards collectivism is expressed by an individual’s identification with 
the collective goal of the group to which he belongs. This too probably can be traced 
back to the communal cooperation in a rice farming civilization discussed above. 
Also, the Confucian heritage of the nation has shaped Japanese groupism by stressing 
more on belongingness than individualism. The word kojin (individual) did not figure 
in the Japanese lexicon till 1891 (Yanabu 1982: 42). Japanese are keenly aware of the 
discrepancy between honne and tatemae. Honne (Private self) means the  natural, real 
or inner wishes an individual may have, whereas tatemae (Public self) refers to the 
standard, principle or rule by which one is bound to the group vis-à-vis one’s ranking 
in the vertical order. In interpersonal relations the public self is given more weight 
than the private identity because group spirit is highly esteemed in a collectivist 
society like Japan. Collectivism involves cooperation, solidarity and the sentimental 
desire for ittaikan (feeling of oneness) with fellow members of one’s group, thus 
preparing the ground for informal channels of networking and information- sharing   16
that would benefit the entire group. The group in Japan has been central to the 
functioning of the country. Radical historical events, such as the fall of the Tokugawa 
regime and the total defeat in World War II, may have altered the exterior of social 
organizations but the pattern of group behaviour in Japan stays on. Note that the 
German Historical School which was a part of their intellectual tradition, as discussed 
before, also maintained that the individual’s role was located within the community. 
 
In a society such as this, where the key value is harmony, either conforming to group 
values or avoiding conflicts becomes essential. A consequence of Collectivism is the 
culture of guilt, (Doi 1971) where a non-conforming action may result in the guilt of 
betraying the group. Therefore, gaining consensus (within a group) becomes very 
necessary. Decisions are arrived at by consultations and committee work. Ringisei (a 
kind of consensus-building measure), found in bureaucracy and the corporate world 
alike, ensures that superiors do not force their ideas on juniors; instead, juniors 
present their views to superiors and have them adopted after deliberations.  
 
3.2.3  Attitudes towards adaptation and assimilation 
 
 The Japanese are known for their eagerness to borrow indiscriminately. They look for 
models in other countries, absorb the idea and reproduce variants of the standard as 
products for domestic consumption. Historically, with a powerful neighbour like China, 
many ideas ranging from those of script, religion, arts, literature, and architecture were 
directly imported. Subsequently such cultural borrowings were internalised to suit 
internal sensibilities. For instance, the kana script has evolved from complex Chinese 
characters. The Taika reforms in the year 645A.D, borrowed from the Chinese model,   17
were perhaps the first attempt to adjust superior alien techniques to familiar indigenous 
conditions. This need for Japanisation of the imbibed knowledge can be regarded as a 
social value. After the Meiji Restoration, when Japan encountered the more ‘developed’ 
Western nations, she did not hesitate to import the superior technology the West had to 
offer. The 4
th and 5
th articles of the Charter Oath (April 1868) adopted at the time of the 
Meiji Restoration called for shedding ‘evil customs of the past’ and searching for 
knowledge even if it meant learning from the outside world to ‘strengthen the national 
polity’. However, Japan had Wakon-yousai (Japanese spirit with western learning) at the 
core of her modernisation. The slogan was advocated by the enlightenment leaders, who 
realised the need for balance. The Japanese spirit was not to be overlooked at any cost 
while embracing the technological and academic progress of the West. This policy was 
adopted as a responsive measure to preserve national identity. This Japanese cultural trait 
was succinctly summed up by Tagore, when he noted that, “Japan cannot altogether lose 
and merge herself in the scientific paraphernalia she acquired from the West and be 
turned into a mere borrowed machine. She has her own soul…and that the process of 
assimilation is going on has been amply proved…” (Tagore 1917, 2002: 7-8) 
 
The attitudinal dimension of this dynamic process of assimilation is governed by yet 
another subset of social values.  
 
a.  Setting goals and Kaizen 
Meticulous planning has been a quality attributed to the Japanese. This social value 
may have emerged from dealing with ‘situational’ hurdles such as the country’s 
geographical limitations. To combat these constraints and decide on the future course 
of action there was always a need for an objective or a goal ahead. Whether it was to   18
catch up with the West after the Meiji Restoration, or turn into an imperialist power, 
or achieve the Income Doubling Plan of 1960, they were all aspirations 
comprehensible as a component of broad national vision and its public declaration. 
Once the target had been decided it was not difficult to motivate the people towards 
the achievement. However, the steps taken to achieve the long-term goal were 
incremental in nature. It becomes, thus, essential to understand the value Japanese 
people attach to ‘Kaizen’. 
     
Popularly, Kaizen refers to a quality control strategy recognised with the management 
practice associated with the Toyota Production system. However, the word originally 
had philosophical associations with Taoism/Zen. (Kojien 5
th edition) Literally, the 
word translates to small change for betterment. The betterment implied here is not 
benefit to an individual, but to the society. 
 
In a goal-driven ‘futuristic’ society, Kaizen methodology includes making small 
changes, monitoring results, and then adjusting. Large-scale pre-planning and 
visualization or projection of radical change is thus comprised of small-scale 
incremental changes. On an experimental basis minor changes can be adopted, and if 
successful, rapidly adapted. In this sense, the direction of adaptation is one of 
continual improvement. It may thus also be conjectured that the Japanese mental 
model towards continuous adaptation and minor improvement in all spheres of 
economic activities was in line with the view of the Historical School that economic 
systems are inherently dynamic in nature. 
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b.  Thrust on miniaturisation (Keiryouka / Kogataka) 
The most obvious reasons of miniaturisation is economising in space. But, while 
miniaturisation of consumer items such as automobiles and refrigerators can be 
explained by their motive to economise on space, miniaturisation of items like mobile 
phones cannot readily be explained by space economy alone. A more comprehensive 
explanation in the Japanese case would probably be that miniaturisation implies a 
kind of aesthetic value addition. The same principle has also guided Japan’s electronic 
industry. One of the most overarching visions driving Japan’s electronics industry has 
been achieving market success by developing trendy, portable variations of a product 
design. Since Sony's introduction of the pocket-sized radio in 1955, the concept of 
miniaturization spread in Japan, where lifestyles and small homes support rapid 
market acceptance of the concept 
10 
 
Indeed, miniaturisation has been an important part of Japanese aesthetics and can be 
seen in their art of bonsai, boxed gardening. It speaks for their refinement in details. 
Their literary tradition of the 17 syllable haiku and poems praising smallness are 
examples for their preference for smallness.  
 
This social value can thus be both a culturally ordained worth and also one that has its 
origin in the, so-called, ‘situational’ motivation. 
 
                                                 
10 The Nippon Keizai newspaper described Japan's miniaturization trend in 1982 with the term kei-
haku-tan-sho (kei, lightweight; haku, thin; tan, short; and sho, small).   20
c.  Love for Nature 
Despite many natural disasters, nature has been a blessing to the people of Japan. The 
sense of oneness with nature underlines the Japanese ethos. Their indigenous faith, 
Shintoism, has nature worship as its core. Also the agrarian nature of society was 
governed by nature and thus the sensitivity towards it.  
 
In the Hellenistic tradition, the idea of ‘conquest of nature’ existed in the West. In the 
East, this idea of subjecting nature to the commands or service of man according to 
his selfish desires has never been cherished (Suzuki  1988 ) 
 
Nature has played a major part in Japanese literature and art as well. ‘Naturalism’ in 
Japan is not the recognition of nature as independent of human beings, but an 
appreciation of the interaction and affinity between people and nature. “She (Japan) 
does not boast of her mastery over nature, but to her she brings, with infinite care and 
joy, her offerings of love”. (Tagore 1917, 2002:27) The Japanese people’s love of 
nature has always been a reflection of their innate aesthetic sense for things beautiful. 
Later, Zen too gave an immense impetus to the feeling for nature.  
 
3.3  Language 
 
Given that human beings do not live in an objective world, language, being the 
medium of expression, becomes an important tool through which outer environment is 
understood, interpreted and structured (Doi 1986). The symbols, words, and 
expressions used in a language mirror social norms, and, at the same time, shape the 
pattern of social interaction. It may be noted that Japan has been successful in   21
implementing a single language system which may be assumed to expedite the 
evolution of any shared mental model among individuals.  
 
4.  Methodology 
 
The four most important organizations for Science and Technology policymaking in 
Japan are the Prime Minister's Council for Science and Technology (CST), the 
Science and Technology Agency (STA), and two ministries: the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
11 and the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). Key issues to be addressed for strengthening 
Japan’s science and technology capabilities are done in consultation with these 
official bodies. The CST was set up in 2001 and serves as the headquarters for the 
promotion of science and technology, besides formulating comprehensive basic 
policies and conducting their overall co-ordination. STA too is a more recently 
established organization that has a definite role in disseminating scientific 
information. MEXT and MITI have been handling policy making since the 
reconstruction of the Japanese Economy after World War II. MITI played a key role 
in deciding technology policy to meet the requirements for industrial development in 
the 1950s and later shifted primarily to promoting international trade in the 1970s. 
Studies so far to understand Japan’s policymaking have focussed, mostly, on the 
Industrial policy and the role of MITI.
12   
 
As ours is a short-term indicative study we have not exhaustively covered the role of 
MITI, but, instead, confined ourselves to the White Papers on Science and 
                                                 
11 Before 2003, MEXT was known as Monbusho (Ministry of Education) 
12 See, for instance, Gao (1997).   22
Technology (Kagakugijutsu Hakusho) of Japan, which have not been the usual focus 
of analysis earlier. These documents are available from the year 1958 (Shouwa 33)
13, 
in the official website of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and 
Technology. With some gaps in the beginning, these White Papers have been an 
annual feature since 1969. Till the year 1988 they appear only in Japanese, after 
which the English versions are also available. Owing to constraints of time and 
resources, we did not go through each of them. Instead, we first identified some key 
years for Science and Technology Policies in Japan based on our understanding of 
Japanese economic history and various important world events. Some such years 
marked by important world events are 1964 (Tokyo Olympic), 1973 (the First Oil 
Crisis) and 1997 (Kyoto Protocol). Besides, the year 1960 is taken as an important 
year in Japanese economic history, when the country announced the ‘Income doubling 
plan’. Similarly, the years 1969 and 1995 are important earmarks in the history of 
patent and intellectual property rights in Japan. While in 1969, they amended their 
patent laws to promote technological capability of the domestic industry, they became 
a signatory to the World Trade Organisation in 1995.  The year 1996, being the year 
when Japan embarked upon her first Basic Plan for Science and Technology, was also 
identified as an important benchmark for our study. In all such cases, the years before 
and after these years were taken up for study. It facilitated an understanding of the 
trend and the follow-up actions the country took. The White Paper of 1986 carried a 
table of summary of new targets and achievements which proved to be a 
corroborating insight into the direction of our research.  In aggregate, the White 
Papers of the following years have been analysed for the present study: 1958, 1962, 
1964, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1981, 1986, 1995, 1996, 1997~2007. The White 
                                                 
13 Japan follows the Nengo system, where the era changes with every new Emperor. It was in the year 
1925 that Emperor Hirohito came to the throne and it was thus the beginning of the Shouwa period. 
The 33
rd year of the Shouwa would translate to 1958.   23
Papers are usually subdivided into different headings such as present circumstances, 
identifiable problems, budget allocations, research directions, sectors to prioritise, 
promotion of research activity, technology trade statistics, domestic and international 
trends and so on. From these headings that recur, trends could be inferred which were 
then substantiated by informal discussion with the researchers in the Embassy of 
Japan. 
 
We have also, from time to time, made use of information available on the websites of 
NISTEP (National Institute of Science and Technology Policy)and the  Japan Science 
and Technology Agency that plays a crucial role in promoting public understanding of 
Science and Technology in Japan.  
 
5.  Informal values and formal policies- An analysis 
 
Based on the discussions of the above sections we analyse the influence of informal 
values, encapsulated in ‘shared mental models’, on formal policies. We divide this 
section into four subsections. Section 5.1 explores the influence of shared mental 
models on policy directives on the nature of technological change. Section 5.2 
explores how shared mental models influenced the policy toward the direction of 
technological change. Section 5.3 discusses the influence of shared mental models on 
the trajectory of policymaking. Finally, section 5.4 analyses how shared mental 
models has shaped the overall objectives of policymaking in technology and industrial 
development in Japan.   24
5.1  Shared mental models and policies on nature of technological change 
 
As early as 1958, Japan’s White Paper on Science and Technology documents that 
Japan would carry out its acquisition of technological capability through ‘kenkyuuno 
kenkyuu’ (chapter 3, section 2.3). The policy document also clearly states that the 
research priority at the time was to focus on commercialisation of technologies, 
through assimilation and incremental innovation. The White Paper of 1964 (chapter 2, 
section 2.2) reiterated the conviction that such capacities to assimilate and improve 
upon acquired technologies would be crucial for achieving international 
competitiveness. 
 
However, until recently, standard economic theory did not consider incremental 
innovation to be of much importance for a country’s economic competitiveness. The 
dominant theoretical paradigm of that time revolved around the framework offered by 
the product cycle and technology gap theories. Both these theories focused only on 
radical innovations and predicted that only industrialised, technology-leader countries 
could have comparative advantage in high technology sectors. Less developed 
countries, on the other hand, were seen as recipients of old technologies in the 
matured phases of product cycles, solely due to their low labour cost advantage.
14 In 
such a framework, therefore,  less developed or developing countries, were not seen to 
derive their international competitive advantage through innovative activities, but 
only through low labour cost advantages in matured technologies. Rosenberg and 
Steinmuller (1988) indeed argue that economists, for a long period, had held the view 
that Japan’s international competitiveness in the automobile sector was based on its 
                                                 
14 See also Franks (1999: 186).   25
low labour costs advantages. Only later, it was recognised that the true reason behind 
the competitive strength lay in the capability to invent through minor innovation and 
reverse engineering.
15 Freeman (1987), in this context asserts that the Japanese effort 
towards acquisition of technological capability through minor innovation and reverse 
engineering did not start with the automobile. Evidences of minor innovation and 
reverse engineering were also present in their technological effort to absorb imported 
technologies in the field of textiles in the nineteenth century. Yamauchi (1986) points 
out that such activity was rather uniquely Japanese and it gave Japan an edge over 
other Asian nations in the cotton industry during the pre-War era. However, such 
achievements were not exclusive to the cotton industry. The evidence of ‘home made’ 
technologies by ‘modifying’ imported technologies became evident in ‘almost all 
industries’ (Freeman 1987: 32-3). 
 
To summarise, Japan had a rather long history of incremental innovation and reverse 
engineering. The literature on economics of technology on the other hand, started 
emphasising the issues of minor innovation and technological capability only in the 
1980s with the pioneering work of Sanjaya Lall, Chris Freeman and others
16. The 
shared mental model for incremental innovation could not thus have been based on 
the then existing paradigms of economic thought. It may, thus, be safely argued that 
Japan’s thrust on incremental innovation and technological absorptive activities 
reflects the shared mental models developed through the prevalent social values of 
‘kaizen’ to achieve a long-term goal of technological capability. 
                                                 
15 In a rather oversimplified manner, such activities have traditionally been seen as imitation, devoid of 
much creativity and R&D. Teece (1981) made a pioneering attempt to point out that imitation is 
neither automatic nor costless and involves creative engagement with technological learning. Surely, 
the Japanese case provides supporting evidence of this view.  
16 The development of this theory perhaps, therefore, owes much of its intellectual debt to Japan’s 
successful experimentation along these lines. However, establishing a definite linkage calls for a 
much detailed research on this issue.    26
Note that the White Papers of 1981 set a new goal for technological activities. 
Departing from its earlier policy goal to focus, predominantly, on assimilation, 
modifications, and improvement of acquired technologies through reverse engineering 
and incremental innovations, the policy document of that year announced its intention 
to focus on fundamental research. Two factors may have motivated such a shift in 
their policy goal. First, their eagerness to develop knowledge-based industry from the 
mid 1970s may have necessitated such a shift. Second, it may have been thought of as 
a natural next step to engage in research which would push the technology frontiers, 
after achieving mastery in reverse engineering.  
  
5.2  Shared mental models and policy on direction of Technological change 
 
Along with the nature of technological activities, the White Papers on Science and 
Technology also contain evidence of how policy interventions shaped the direction of 
technological change in Japan. Among many such possible directions, we examine 
how some of the formal policy proposals demonstrated informal values of affining 
with nature and aesthetic appreciation of miniaturisation.  
 
Affinity to nature 
With the state-defined national goals of rapid industrialisation for reconstructing the 
economic base in the post war period, deterioration of the living environment was, 
perhaps, inevitable. With the main thrust on manufacturing industries, environment 
concerns were sidelined. However, it was soon realised that such a path of 
industrialisation would prove to be damaging for the environment (Freeman 1987).  In 
fact, grass-roots pressure groups started emerging from the 1960s itself to present the   27
discontentment of civil society against rising environmental problems. A series of 
lawsuits were also filed in the early 1970s accusing the industry of being responsible 
for damaging the environment. Subsequently, Japan began in the early 1970s to 
combat pollution on an official governmental level, with the establishment of the 
Environmental Agency. What is more interesting, and perhaps unique to Japan, is the 
proclamation of the Japanese Government to switch its path of industrialisation as a 
means to combat pollution. In 1971, the White Paper on International Trade and 
Industry announced a shift from “pollution–prone” and “natural-resource-consuming” 
heavy and chemical industries towards “clean” and “brain-intensive’ industries. 
(Ozawa 1974: 11).  
 
Appreciation for miniaturisation 
The appreciation for miniaturisation has also shaped Japanese technology 
policymaking. The 1970 White Paper (Chapter 2, Section 1v) demonstrates the same 
with an example of microelectronics which shows 70% reduction in the size of 
electronic parts compared to those that existed in 1907. Graph (1-9) in the same text 
indicates that Japan’s introduction of IC in electronic products from 1968 further 
facilitated the downsizing process. Another instance of miniaturisation can be found 
in the White Paper of 2005 which discusses at length how the weight of a mobile 
phone changed from 750gm in 1987 to 70gm in 2005. Along with the inherent social 
value of appreciating smallness, the German Historical School’s insistence that the 
State be involved in promoting aesthetics may have also contributed to the formation 
of a shared mental model of miniaturisation.  
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5.3  Shared mental models and trajectory of policy making 
 
It was observed during the course of our study that since 1969 there have been annual 
publications of White Papers which address, discuss and analyse problems the country 
faces.  
 
The annual publication of White Papers also indicates the attitude towards setting of 
goals and their achievement in a step- by- step manner, as we discussed in the section 
on social values. Much before the Oil Crisis made it mandatory to economise on 
energy intensity, Japan had, in fact, initiated the process of shifting away from 
traditional energy intensive industrialisation to the knowledge intensive path of 
industrialisation, arguably to save the environment.  
 
The annual publication of White Papers also reflects Japan’s preference for small 
incremental policy changes over rapid discontinuous ones. There is less uncertainty in 
small policy changes and help develop consensus in the society more easily. The fact 
that such a course of policy making has been quite effective can be understood from a 
relatively less number of policy reversals in Japan.
17  We found another manifestation 
of Japan’s preference for consensus building in our readings of the White Papers. 
Normally, the indication of a policy change is made much ahead of its actual 
implementation. Specific cases of this type of policy dynamics include the stated 
intention to address the issues of ageing society (first announced in 1962), and a 
policy shift to creative research (announced in 1981) from the path of applied R&D. It 
                                                 
17 This point was first brought to our notice by Y. Furukawa, the First Secretary, Japan Embassy, New 
Delhi   29
may be safely conjectured that this time gap is used effectively to develop a consensus 
on concerned issues.  
 
The White Papers also prove to be excellent examples of meticulous planning with 
‘futuristic goals’ (Dore 1987: chapter 10).  The aspect of meticulous planning is 
reflected in the thrust on technology foresight surveys, which are conducted on a 
regular basis to reduce the scope of the unintended consequences of a new 
technology.  The emphasis on ‘futuristic goals’ is evident in the White Paper for 2005, 
which carries Japan’s 21
st century vision and future prospects (chapter 1.3; column 
19).  Such long- term broad visions are set as targets and achieved over a period of 
time in an incremental manner. With long-term prospects in mind the policies are 
fashioned to achieve time-bound goals. 
 
A careful study of the White Papers also reveals Japanese enthusiasm on learning 
from other countries in a manner consistent with their adaptive and assimilative spirit. 
The White Papers of 1958 draw inspiration from technological trends in the United 
States, England, the former USSR and West Germany. White papers of a later time 
period cover the direction of many more countries from South East Asia, Latin 
America and Africa. 
 
5.4  Shared mental models and objectives of technology policy 
 
It is common knowledge that modern economics justifies policy intervention only to 
allocate resources for ‘public’ goods in the face of externalities and market failure. 
Interestingly, nevertheless, despite being one of the pioneering countries to adopt   30
industrial and technology policy, such reasoning did not find much space in the policy 
debate in Japan for a long time (Komiya 1999: 80). From time to time, various 
scholars have tried to describe state interventions in Japan in terms of some popularly 
understood notions such as “nationalism”, “developmentalism”, or a “plan rational” 
(see Gao 1997, Johnson 1999 for a review) The documents of the MITI, however, 
claim that industrial policy in Japan “simply grew” and attempts to theorise such 
interventions began only after 1960s (Johnson 1999: 27-8). Our analysis also indicates 
that the scope and the dimensions of policy interventions were, perhaps, much 
broader, to be grouped, exclusively, under any of the abovementioned classifications. 
Technological policies pervade almost all aspects of the interaction between 
technology-economy and society. Providing guidelines with respect to the nature of 
technological change (incremental innovations), directing the paths of technological 
activities through the promotion of aesthetic values of miniaturisation, establishing 
harmony with nature (Ojimi 1970), maintaining the social fabric (through consensus 
building effort) and so on have all have been given due care in technology policy 
making in Japan. Moreover, Japan also pioneered the concept of protecting 
“depressed industries”, to which many other countries did not pay much attention, 




To capture the all the nuances of technology policy in Japan, one has to study the 
complex interplay of various informal institutions and ideological thinking which 
gave legitimacy to authoritative interventions by the State in almost all spheres of 
Japanese  social and economic life. From our discussions, the social values pertaining 
                                                 
18 For instance, lack of mobility of capital between sectors, divergence between social and private rates 
of discount etc. See Peck et al (1999) for details.   31
to “adherence to hierarchy” and the lasting impact of the German Historical School 
can be identified as two major factors contributing to the evolution of such a shared 
mental model.  
 
The influence of the social norm of “adherence to hierarchy” is rather straightforward. 
Hence we try to try only to explain the influence of the German Historical School. In 
our discussion of the German Historical School in section 2, we have pointed out that 
the State was supposed to promote the intellectual and aesthetic culture of a country. 
Furthermore, the State should also extend support to the weaker section in general, 
and labour in particular. While aspects like thrust on miniaturisation can be grouped 
under the State’s responsibility to promote aesthetic culture, the State’s role in 
protecting the interests of the weaker sections and rights of labourers can be seen in 
policies related to ageing population and protection of depressed industries. As 
Freeman (1987) points out, the need for a long-term policy to generate a strong base 
of ‘mental capital’ (intellectual capital or human resource) can also be linked to the 
ideological tradition of the German Historical School (pp. 98-100). Freeman (1987) 
also summarises the views of Fredric List, leading scholar in the German Historical 
School, to emphasise that there is a need to link technology guidelines to industrial 
and education policies. Please note that ever since Japan clarified its objective of 
shifting gradually from reverse engineering-oriented applied exploration to creative 
research, she has also stressed the need to overhaul her education system to augment 
necessary “mental capital”. Interestingly, the Ministries of education, culture, sports 
and science and technology have been merged to form MEXT in the year 2003. The 
two points mentioned above perhaps give credence to the claim that Japan’s   32
policymaking exercises, even today, are deeply influenced by the shared mental 
models developed through the influence of the Historical School.  
 
6.  Concluding remarks: Significance for India 
 
Our study, therefore, indicates that informal institutions and intellectual tradition, 
encapsulated in ‘shared mental models’, influenced the technology policy of Japan in 
many important ways. Any interpretation of our results should, however, be done 
with, at least, the caveat that the ongoing process of globalisation under WTO 
significantly limits the scope of a national government to frame policies according to 
the prevailing social norms. In the current global order, therefore, much is left to the 
innovativeness of policy makers to incorporate social norms in a judicious manner. 
 
Drawing on the significance of such a study, which attempts to explore the 
compatibility between social norms and formal institutions, for India is always 
difficult owing to the sheer diversity of social norms and cultural predispositions 
found in the country. Indeed, barring the history of the last two centuries of British-
India, such pluralism did translate into a very diverse institutional framework and 
legal pluralism in various spheres of economic and social activity. It may be worth 
analysing whether such a policy framework can be re-introduced in formulating 
modern day science policy in India.  
 
Compared to Japan, and many other countries, India has a longer and, arguably, richer 
history of cultural exchange, making it even more difficult to pinpoint the social 
norms which are “predominantly Indian”. The limited scope of this study also   33
prevents us from exploring such dimensions in detail. However, two characteristics of 
Indian society would clearly stand out. First, Indian society has always been open to 
“accepting other cultures” thereby demonstrating an inherent capacity, like Japan, to 
“adapt and assimilate” from diverse sources. Japanese policy making has incorporated 
this attribute in shaping its technological, as well as, policy trajectories.  The White 
Papers of Science and Technology consistently devote a section on the experiences of 
an assorted set of countries, in order to draw relevant policy lessons for Japan. In 
India, however, the merit of such an exercise is, perhaps, less appreciated and quite 
often examples are drawn only from one or two leading countries in order to frame 
policies. 
 
Amartya Sen (2005) highlights another (second) distinctive feature of Indian society, 
namely, loquaciousness. Two important implications for policy making would follow.  
First, consensus building through exchange of views should be taken as an important 
path to policy formulation.  Debates and discussions in turn will generate more 
information required to analyse the problem situation that the policy addresses. This 
process would facilitate evidence-based, meticulous policy formulation. 
Unfortunately, however, our policy statements do not conform to these properties. For 
instance, the policy document, which made the radical departure from India’s old 
policy of inward looking development to liberalisation and globalisation does so, 
purportedly, on the basis of the following reasoning: 
 
“But any added liberalization which effectively requires tariff cuts will also 
likely meet with a significant response for reasons suggested above. In fact it 
seems very reasonable to argue that revenues may even rise in view of the 
extremely high tariffs now. Thus, in … the so called Laffer curve, the 
horizontal axis measures the average tariff rate and the vertical axis measures   34
revenues collected. When tariff rates are prohibitive, nothing gets imported, 
and there is no revenue. When rates are zero, no revenue gets raised either. So, 
the curve meets the horizontal axis at the origin and at high tariff that 
eliminates imports. In between, it rises and must fall. Assuming only a single 
peak, we can plausibly assume that we are to the right of this peak and will 
therefore increase tariff revenues by liberalizing consumer imports with QR 
expansions and tariff reductions” (emphases own, White Paper 1993: 38)
19. 
 
Mukherjee (2008) shows that some of the eventualities predicted above depend on a 
restrictive set of assumptions. Also, no evidence was used to justify the set of 
assumptions made in the statement (See Mukherjee 2008: 3-5 for detail). The fact that 
some of these purely academic points were not dealt with perhaps show the reluctance 
of the policymakers to incorporate the arguments of the academic community, let 
alone others, in a comprehensive manner while formulating policies.  
 
Unfortunately, however, there is no reversal of this tendency and important policy 
changes are still being prescribed without adequate discussion and argument. The 
recent proposal to introduce intellectual property rights on public-funded research in 
Indian universities and government research institutes provide an example. 
Presumably, such a law would facilitate technology transfer from universities to 
industry by giving ownership to the scientists of their publicly-funded research 
outputs. However, the implications of protection of knowledge and entrepreneurial 
aspirations/capacities of academic professors vary across cultures (Gittelman 2006). 
Japanese professors have not been very proactive in exploring entrepreneurial options, 
even when they have property rights on their innovations (Toyama and Hasegawa 
1982, Etskowitz et al 2000). There is also no study to establish that entrepreneurial 
aspirations/capacities are prevalent among members of Indian academia. One also 
                                                 
19 As quoted in Mukherjee (2008: 3)   35
needs to investigate how tax- payers would react to an arrangement which seeks to 
privately appropriate the results of ‘public’ funding.
20 Interestingly, even the 
complexities of such a scale have not inspired the policy makers of this 
“argumentative” country to invite discussion on this important procedure.  
 
So, how do the academic community and the public at large, who belong to this 
argumentative tradition, feel on being relegated to the sidelines of debate on policy 
making? If Sen’s (2005) recollection of a poem by Ram Mohan Roy
21 can be taken at 
face value , they cannot but feel helpless in death, because “Roy explains what is 
really dreadful about death” (ibid: 32): 
 
 “ Just consider how terrible the day of your death will be. 
  Others will go on speaking, and you will not be able to argue back”
22 
                                                 
20 In the United States of America this was a major concern of academia in the 1960s and 1970s, which 
constrained them from engaging in patent filing activities. See Mowery (2005) for details. 
21 A leading reformer of 19
th century India.  
22 As quoted in Sen (2005): 33.   36
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